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VIKING AND MAILSTAR
TWO SWEDISH SMALL SATELLITE PROJECTS
Mr Sven Grahn
Chief Engineer
Head, System Design Dept
space Division
Swedish Space Corporation
ABSTRACT
The VIKING Scientific Satellite launched
piggyback on Ariane in February 1986
collected magnetospheric data for 444 days.
The project was highly successful and of low
cost. The key to low cost and high performance lies in a careful formulation of
mission requirements. Costly increases often
come from secondary or derived requirements,
i.e. requirements which optimize performance
or scientific return. To squeeze out a few
more per cent of science data may perhaps
double the cost. The paper describes examples of how such cost traps were avoided in
the VIKING project.
KAILSTAR is a low-orbit store-and-forward

satellite communications system conceived by
the Swedish Space Corporation. phase B
studies have just been completed and show
that it is possible to provide a high reliability public telecommunications service by
using small satellites. The satellite concept is described as well as different
launching concepts, including a piggyback
arrangement on the Chinese Long March 2
rocket.
VIKING
Sweden's first satellite, VIKING, was launched on February
22, 1986 as a piggyback payload on the Ariane 1 rocket that
orbited the French remote sensing satellite SPOT. The
satellite conducted a very successful magnetospheric research mission until May 12, 1987. The VIKING project was
managed by the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC) under contract from the Swedish Board for Space Activities, the

government space agency. sse is a government-owned organization responsible for the execution of Sweden's space
program. The satellite was developed by SAAB Space with
Boeing Aerospace as a major subcontractor.
The project aimed at gathering new insights into the formation of Aurora Bore~lis by making a complete set of plasma
physics measurements in the magnetosphere at an altitude of
2 earth radii and on magnetic field lines connected to the
auroral oval. Fig. 1 summarizes the key features of the
project and Fig. 2 shows the configuration of the satellite.
Fig. 1

Summary of the VIKING Project
THE VIKING SATELLITE PROJECT
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Sweden's first own venture into space had high scientific
ambitions in the field of geocosmosphysics, traditionally a
very strong area of space science in Sweden. The project
also had the purpose of building a technology base in
Sweden for carrying out the design and operation of space
systems. These ambitious goals had to be carried out within
a very tight fiscal envelope.
Such constraints made it necessary to make some rather
difficult technical and scientific trade-offs. It is the
story about these trade-offs and how they eventually led to
a very successful mission that the first part of the paper
intends to convey .
Defining the Scientific Mission
When a small nation sets out to make its first scientific
satellite it is important to choose the scientific objective carefully. If one chooses an objective which requires
the satellite to make a long-duration mapping of certain
phenomena one arrives at completely different technical
trade-offs than with an "exploratory" objective. An "exploratory" mission, in which one wishes to make a concentrated
assault on some specific scientific problems, does not
require a satellite which lasts for many years. It becomes
possible to trade platform reliability and complexity
against scientific payload.
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The VIKING satellite

The scientists did indeed choose an "exploratory" objective
for VIKING and even adopted a "campaign" mode of operating
the science instruments. During periods of a few weeks all
the investigators gathered at the ground station and ran a
continuous scientific seminar. The satellite was used to
test the theories that were put forward in the seminar room
next to the Operations Center. Such a mission philosophy
permitted some rather interesting technical trade-offs.

Adapting to the-Launch Opportunity
During the first studies of the VIKING project in 1978 we
looked for an orbit that would give maximum access to the
altitude region 10,000-15,000 km. The first orbit we
studied would have an apogee at about 15,000 km and a
perigee at whatever altitude that a piggyback launch opportunity would provide. It was clear from the beginning that
we could not afford our own launch vehicle. We had to ride
piggyback ,into space. The inclination that we felt was most
useful was 63-65 degrees, which would permit the apogee to
be fixed over the northern hemisphere, thereby permitting
all the science data gathering to take place within view of
our ground station at Kiruna in the northern part of
Sweden.
This inclination was studied because we were considering
using a Soviet launch vehicle at that time. Many soviet
launches use such inclinations.
So, this kind of orbit seemed ideal. Therefore considerable
scepticism was felt by the project team when the use of a
piggyback launch opportunity on the planned launch of SPOT
by an Ariane rocket was introduced.
The SPOT/Ariane launch would put VIKING into an i=98.7 deg
circular orbit at 822 km altitude. By firing an on-board
motor the required 15,000 km apogee would be achieved.
However, for this orbit the argument of perigee would not
be fixed. In fact, it takes two years for the apseline to
rotate once around the earth (Fig. 3). This at first seemed
quite unsuitable for our mission.

Apsaltne turns 360 _
approxl ....tely 2 years

88S

...----

-----

,," ---- ................... ,..,.." ~
/~

/

I

I

/

.... "
\

"

\

/ "

I

I
I
I
\
\

I

I

I

/

"

N

I
I

\
"

"

"

I
I

\

\

I
\

I

/1

I

\
"

I

\
I
I

'\

"

I
\

"..... ~

,
"

\

I
I
\

\

Fig. 3

in

/

/

/

1",/

'

...... -

-'

,,;~

Rotation of the Apseline of the VIKING Orbit

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

However, orbit iimulations showed that the motion of the
apseline offered an opportunity to scan over different
regions of the magnetosphere and magnetic latitude. We
found that the orbit would permit the study of the interesting regions of the northern polar magnetosphere for about
8 months before the apogee had drifted too far south.
Since the mission was designed to be exploratory, i.e. most
scientific questions would "receive an answer" within a few
months after launch it was decided to adopt 8 months as the
design lifetime of the satellite. We assigned a rather
arbitrary number of 80% as the analytical probability for
satellite survival during these 8 months.
A piggyback launch usually severely limits the satellite
mass and/or volume. This was also the case for VIKING,
especially in terms of satellite height. The volume available to us between the Ariane third stage payload adapter
and the SPOT satellite was only 0.5 meters high but about 2
meters in diameter (Fig. 4).
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Fig. 4

The VIKING/SPOT Piggyback Arrangement

This naturally put a limitation on solar array area, which
more or less dictated the power budget of the satellite. We
had adopted a design rule of having only bodyfixed solar
panels. Mission analysis showed that the whole science
payload could operate for 80 minutes on every orbit. 180
minutes could be achieved on some orbits if idle orbits

were inserted before and after such a long-duration data
taking.
The bottom line of the mass budget of the satellite was
rather easy to determine. The Ariane 1 had 550 kg of spare
capability for the SPOT 1 launch. To get VIKING's apogee up
to 15,000 km, and assuming a gross weight of 500 kg, about
230 kg of solid rocket propellant is needed. Thus the dry
weight of the satellite had to be roughly 270 kg. (Actually
it was 286 kg and the required propellant mass fits very
well with the STAR 26 C motor in the Thiokol rocket motor
catalogue! )
One could then rather quickly estimate the mass of the
structure and essential subsystems and hence arrive at the
science payload mass. The mass of the science payload could
be traded off against redundancy in the basic subsystems of
the satellite. If one did not wish to trade science payload
against redundancy the only remaining alternative was to
reduce apogee, and thereby compromising the scientific
objectives.
Well, the apogee requirement was reduced slightly (it was
required to exceed 13,000 km), but the crucial decision was
made to fly the mission with a "single-thread" system, i.e.
no redundancy in the satellite. This decision was possible
because we had adopted an 8 month lifetime and analysis
showed that a single-thread system would meet the 80%
reliability requirement.
However, reliability calculations do not make the system
engineering manager sleep well at night. Only a quality
conscious team of manufacturers does. SAAB and Boeing
were such a team.
Supressing "Nice-To-Have" Requirements
So, the Ariane piggyback opportunity had led to trade-offs
meaning an 8 month design life, a single-thread system and
80 minutes of data-taking per orbit.
,This was a good start towards achieving a low-cost highyield mission. However, what now remained was to combat the
tendency to optimize every aspect of the system. This is
what the engineer is trained to do. But in this tendency
lurks the danger of cost increases which may threaten the
project (if it gets too expensive it may be cancelled).
The tendency to make an optimum mission and system design I
sometimes call the "secondary requirements trap". Secondary, "derived" or "nice-to-have" requirements are like the
octopus' arms in Fig. 5. You have to chop them off as soon
as they appear through the door, otherwise they will catch
you! Let me give you some examples from the VIKING project!
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Fig. 5

The System Engineering Manager Fighting
"Nice-to-have" Requirements

Defining the "Mission Target". The region of maximum scientificinterest (or "mission target") was defined as the
altitude range 8,000-15,000 km, 60-80 degrees invariant
latitude, local time at the field line footprint=18-24,
season=October1-April1 (see Fig. 6). The orbital parameters of the VIKING orbit should be optimized to maximize
the time spent in this four-dimensional box. The boundary
condition was naturally the 98.7 deg, 822 km initial orbit
with the ascending node at 2230 local time and a launch
date at any time of the yearr
The four-dimensional box could be reduced to constraints
for two orbital parameters. One of these was a requirement
for defining the initial argument of perigee so that the
apogee would culminate over the north pole during the time
oct-March. The other requirement derived from the fourdimensional box was to control the local time of the
ascending node. In fig. 7 the field-line footprint
requirement has been converted into ascending node time.

• Local tilDe of field-line footprint: 1800-2400 hours
• Season: October 1 - March 31

Fig. 6

Four-dimensional "Mission Target"

Line A describes the orbit provided by Ariane and the
mission could start at any point on this line. The line B
shows the motion of the local time of the node in the
operational orbit of VIKING (822-15,000 km i=98.7). How to
maximize the length of B falling within the "Mission
Target" marked in fig. 7?
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VIKING "Mission Target" Expressed in a
Date vs. Node Orientation Diagram
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well-trained and enthusiastic satellite controllers with a
mandate to take action when needed are indeed an insurance
against premature mission failure!
The "Resource Envelope" Concept - An Example. There was no
spare VIKING satellite, only a protoflight model, and no
immediate follow-up mission planned. So, why not play it
safe and put in as much radiation shielding as possible to
make the instruments function as long as possible? Well,
that may seem like the clever thing to do, but we adopted a
different philosophy. System Engineering decided that there
could be no general rule, the scientists had to decide
among themselves and sometimes each instrument designer
made his own choice.
For example, some instruments would yield significant
results after having been in operation only for a few days
or weeks while other instruments needed a longer time to
"reap the harvest". of course the whole complement of
instruments worked together and should work as a system for
a certain minimum time.
As it turned out each instrument designer chose his own
way. One designer put in minimum shielding and used the
extra mass to have more functional features while another
played it safer and put in 5 mm of Al as a shield.
Thus, the allocation of shielding mass between experiments
was never something that System Engineering worried about.
This was all handled within the group of investigators.
System Engineering had given the scientists a "resource
envelope" within which they could make their own tradeoffs.
The resource envelope contained a total mass, power and
data rate for the overall science payload. No margin was
given for this envelope. It was an absolute, never-to-betrespassed boundary! This principle generated a lot of
ingenuity in the design and operation of the science payload and contributed to the very efficient mission and it
gave a stability to the system design work which contributed to the low cost.
Of course, if you set up such an absolute "envelope" you
cannot cheat - System Engineering has to be quite open
about the fact that there are margins, but explain that he
keeps the margins in his own pocket to hand out to subsystems and payload if really serious problems turn up.
This kind of "local self-government" requires mutual trust
between scientists and system designers - absolutely!

Where We Did Not Compromise
My description of the trade-offs made in the system desian
of VIKING may have given the impression that we always h d
to yield to fiscal pressures and compromise mission safety
and scientific return at every technical decision point.
This was definitely not so. We took some calculated risks,
I admit, but the really mission-essential requirements were
adhered to strictly. For example the satellite was extremely electrostatically clean. We had conductive cover glass
on solar cells and conductive thermal control paint and
thermal blankets. We even put a slightly conducting
"radome" on the log-spiral radio antennas in order to
ascertain that the satellite body made good electrical
contact with the space plasma. In this way the satellite
would cause the minimum disturbance to the plasma environment.
Another scientific requirement that was strictly enforced
was that of maintaining a high data rate. This was absolutely essential to transmit wave spectra, auroral images and
other data streams. We used as much RF output power as
possible without upsetting the DC power budget. When that
did not suffice we introduced convolutional encoding (only
used by deep space probes at that time) and a viterbi
decoder on the ground. This modification cost nothing in
the satellite but maybe a hundred thousand dollars in
ground equipment. This bought us a 5.6 dB better link and
fulfilled a mission-essential requirement!
The risk of not having redundancy had to be compensated
for. Therefore equipment and subsystems qualified and
flight proven in other programs were used to the maximum
extent. In addition the prime contractor SAAB Space enforced very strict quality assurance procedure for critical
subsystems such as the S-band transponder and other parts
of the TT&C system.
Finally, I wish to show a visible example of VIKING's
"scientific harvest", A UV image of the auroral oval
(Fig. 9). VIKING was able to produce such an image every 20
seconds, a vast improvement over earlier satellites.
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The obvious answer is to let VIKING stay in the low 822 km
orbit until one has reached the region R. Then the motor
would be fired and the mission would proceed along a line C
with the same slope as B. The point along the orbit where
the motor would fire controls the argument of perigee and
by using this strategy full control over the orientation of
the orbit would be achieved for an arbitrary launch date.
The drawbacks with this strategy are that you have to keep
the rocket motor in storage in space for a long time and
the risk of mission loss is increased. You cannot rollout
booms and remove sensor covers before motor ignition and
therefore there would be a long period of no scientific
data. Also, it would be necessary to have stored-command
capability and deployed antenna booms which could withstand
the high-g rocket impulse. In addition, the thermal control
system would have had to be designed for two cases, the
spin vector in the orbital plane and perpendicular to the
orbital plane. The simple thermal concept with a "cold" and
a "hot" side of the satellite would not have been possible.
This scheme was never adopted for one very simple reason the risk of loosing the mission while waiting for motor
ignition during months was not worth taking. It was better
to get some data quickly even if the orbit orientation was
not optimum. So, we decided to fire the motor on the third
orbit by timer control and there would be no communication
with the satellite from lift-off until after the motor had
fired and antenna booms could be safely deployed. (Thus,
the mission proceeded along line B in Fig. 7.) We also
deleted the requirement for stored commands. with the
apogee over the north pole we had plenty of contact time on
every orbit and only real-time control was used.
The decision to fire the motor immediately was essentially
made by the scientists. I concocted the optimized strategy
and presented it to the scientists to see how die-hard the
requirements for an optimum orbit was! I got my answer. We
then used only a varying argument of perigee to maximize
the time within the four-dimensional box. Another boundary
condition was added to the mission design; but a very wise
and cost-saving condition! Another octupus' arm chopped
off!
Protecting the Power System. The thing we feared most in
the operation of the satellite was to destroy the battery.
Solar panel power was only half of the peak load with all
experiments turned on. Protecting the battery became a real
obsession with the Flight Operations crew. Since we only
had one ground station, losing contact with the satellite
while there was full power load on the bus would be
dangerous.
Such an unfortunate situation could appear either as a
result of an operator error; forgetting to switch off the

payload and transmitter before LOS, or because of a failure
in the command up link transmitter.
Therefore the satellite had an amp-hour meter which
monitored the state-of-charge (SOC) of the battery and
switched off non-essential loads in case the SOC dropped
too low. Therefore we did not need to invest in a redundant
uplink transmitter on hot standby. This saved a not insignificant sum in the project.
This all sounded safe, but as the mission proceeded the
amp-hour meter could not be used as intended and we were
left with no automatic protection against discharging the
batteryl And, as stated by Murphy's Law, we had a failure
in the 1 kW uplink transmitter!
The uplink transmitter power suddenly started dropping
during a middle-of-the-night pass when the satellite was
operating at maximum power drain. Within a few minutes the
transmitter power had dropped to zero. What saved the
mission? Certainly not any automatic device - we had none
left to rely upon! No, it was the satellite ground controller who, all alone in the dead of the night, took all the
right decisions in a matter of seconds before losing all
uplink power. She switched off all non-essential loads
before contact was lost and saved the mission.

Fig. 8

The VIKING Operations Center
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Fig. 9

Aurora over Greenland on March 25, 1986. Image
taken from 8090 km altitude at 2047 UT.
Image: VIKING and the University of Calgary

MAILSTAR
Since 1984 the Swedish Space Corporation has been studying
a commercial low-orbit store-and-forward communications
system based on the use of small satellites. The market for
the system is Swedish industry and trading companies operating in the Third World. These studies have been supported
by the Swedish Board for Space Activities and a company
established to commercialize the concept, the Mailstar Co.
The Mailstar Company is owned by the Swedish Telecommunications Administration, SAAB Space, Ericsson Radio and the
Swedish Space Corporation. Phase B has been completed.
Network Principle
The system is based on a network structure as in Fig. 10. A
base station handles all traffic between users. A remote
terminal drops a message in the satellite "Mailbox". The
base station reads the memory on each passage over the base
station and relay messages to destinations in Sweden via

the terrestrial -network. Messages to other remote terminals
and messages from Sweden to remote terminals are uploaded
to the "Mailbox" computer memory. The base station also
uplink a "polling list" which the satellite uses to control
traffic with remote terminals. Thus the satellite exercises
system control.

MAl LST AR

NETWORK STRUCTURE

Fig. 10 .. MAILSTAR Network Principle
The use of a high-latitude base station is very advantageous for serving the whole world from a polar orbit. As seen
in Fig. 11, 70% of all orbits in one day pass within "view"
of a base station assumed to be placed at Kiruna Sweden.
Two kinds of remote terminals have been studied, a 64 kbps
model with a 0.7 meter steerable dish and a 2 kbps model
with a fixed omni antenna. The remote terminal is built
around a personal computer.
Traffic Capacity
Traffic simulations show that with two satellites in orbit,
each having a 64 kbps link and an 80 Mbit memory 200-300
Mbyte can be transferred in and out of Sweden per day. This
assumes that there are 130 remote terminals transmitting
short messages. Of these terminals 40% are assumed to be
located in each of Latin America and Asia while 10% are
located in each of Africa and Oceania.
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MAILSTAR Contact Times. One Satellite in a
h=822 km, i=98.7 deg Orbit.

The average delay between transmission and reception of a
message is around 2.5 hours while 95% of all messages have
reached their destinations within 7 hours.
The high data rate has been determined to be able to handle
areas of high user density where up to 75 terminals may be
within view of the satellite.
Satellite Design
The characteristics of the space segment are summarized in
Fig. 12, and the configuration and size is shown in Fig.13.
The Mailstar project has been conceived as a purely commer
cial enterprise. Thus, high capacity, low cost and high
reliability have been design drivers. These considerations
led to a coherent set of trade-offs. Some of the trade-offs
related to the satellite design and their influence on
ground terminal design are "walked through" below.
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MAILSTAR Space Segment Summary
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MAILSTAR Satellite Configuration and Size
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Piggyback Again. It was clear from the feasibility study
phase that the space segment would dominate overall costs.
Therefore we tried very hard to make the satellites as
small and cheap to launch as possible. We aimed at small
satellites that could be launched piggyback. To find
regularly available launch opportunities is essential to
run a commercial space system. At the moment this is not
easy for any commercial space system operator. To find
regularly occuring piggyback launches is even harder!
Therefore the satellite has been designed to fit several
launch vehicles. The basic launch vehicle adapter ring of
the satellite is compatible with SCOUT. Using SCOUT is not
a piggyback launch, but if there are no piggyback launches
available one may be forced to buy a dedicated launch.
Right now, the cheapest dedicated launcher is the SCOUT.
To fit the Ariane and CZ-2 launch vehicles special adapters
have been designed. For Ariane a 1194 mm diameter tube
structure like the VIKING central tube houses the satellite
during launch. The main satellite, a SPOT or other remote
sensing satellite is placed on top of this tube. After
separating the main satellite the tube with Mailstar is
separated from the third stage and the Mailstar satellite
is then ejected from the tube.

Otameter 2.2 meter

Long Mllrch 2 rocket

Fig 14. CZ-2 Piggyback Arrangement

For the CZ-2 a "propulsive adapter" called the Orbital
Transfer r'lodule has been designed (Fig. 14). This is in
essence a conical adapter structure with rocket motors for
giving a two impulse Hohmann transfer from the initial 175400 km orbit to a h=l200 km circular orbit.
Satellite Size and the Allocation of System Gain. It is
reasonably safe to assume that the smaller the satellite
is, the lower are the launch costs. However, the smaller
the satellite, the smaller the solar panel area is available. Lack of solar panel area limits the DC power avail
able and essentially sets an upper limit for the RF output
power of the downlink transmitter serving the customers.
Market studies show that up to 64 kbps data rate is needed
to serve the customers. with satellite output power, antenna gain (essentially an antenna with hemispheric coverage)
and data rate more or less fixed the gain of the ground
user terminal could easily be determined. For the L-band
frequencies chosen, it turned out that a dish with about
0.75 meter diameter is needed to achieve the system gain
necessary to support 64 kbps. Thus, satellite size dictates
ground antenna diameter.
However, the satellite moves across the sky, so this antenna has to be steerable. A monopulse tracking system is
costly even in mass production, so the design of the remote
user terminal is based on knowledge of the satellite orbit.
The terminal receives orbital data from the satellite. This
data is transmitted as part of protocol headers. The terminal calculates azimuth and elevation and sends commands to
step-motors driving the antenna dish.
Thus, the antenna is steered by "dead reckoning". Studies
show that orbital parameters need only be updated every
fortnight. A total pointing error of the remote terminal
antenna of 5-7 degrees has been allocated in the link
budget. The orbit computation error contribution to this
total error has been set at 2 degrees. Remaining errors are
mainly alignment errors in setting up the antenna azimuth
turntable.
On-Board Redundancy. The space segment costs increase with
redundancy, but so does system life. Studies showed that it
was highly cost-effective to have each satellite fully
redundant, i.e. all subsystems except the mass memory for
message storage have been assumed to be redundant. So, in
constrast to VIKING which completely lacked on-board
redundancy, this small satellite project ended up with a
fully redundant system deSign.
Project Status
The system has been fully cos ted and independent market
surveys have been made. Competitive tariffs have been set
and a normal business analysis has been made to determine
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return-on investment, financial risk exposure and other
viability indicators. The analysis shows that the system
can earn a handsome profit as a purely commercial system
without subsidies of any sort. However, similar services
can be provided through geostationary satellites promising
a higher profit and lower risk exposure for the system
operator.
However, a significant part of the prospective customers
prefer an independent and self-contained communications
system like Mailstar over a geostationary system requiring
several hops for global traffic. The inherent resistance to
jamming and eavesdropping of the Mailstar system is also an
attractive feature. Therefore the system is being re-evaluated to serve such "closed user groups".
Some technical concept changes may be necessary and it is
probable that the system must share the space segment with
other missions. Hopefully, by the time this conference
convenes again we shall be able to report on the new
definition of the system.
CONCLUSION
The recent experience in operating and designing small
satellites in Sweden has demonstrated that such vehicles
are highly useful for sophisticated science missions and
that they also are commercially profitable in the field of
store-and-forward communications.
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